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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MAHALA E. LAWLOR 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs 
R. KEITH LAWLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S 
"BRIEF 
Case No. 77 42 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant. were married at Brigham 
City, Utah, on the 8th day of May, 1931 (R. 32.) They 
have one child, Ian Keith Lawlor, 20 years of age, and 
because he is in the military service of the United States, 
the Court made a finding that he had reached his ma-
jority (R. 12). Prior to 1942, the parties resided at 
North Logan, and in September of that year they moved 
into a small home at 38 North 1st East, Logan. It is 
an old home and is partially modern (R. 33, 38). They 
purchased it about October 21, 1944, at a cost of 
$1600.00, paid from joint funds (R. 33, 58, 61). Plain-
tiff purchased necessary furniture and a refrigerator, 
bathtub and bedroom suite (R. 37)· She has also paper-
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ed and painted the interior of the house several times 
(R. 37, 38, 62). 
Defendant is partially disabled resulting from in-
jury received in military service for the Canadian Gov-
ernment in World War I, and has been drawing month-
ly compensation of $25.00 (R. 40). Since the year 1942, 
the defendant has not had regular employment (R. 38), 
and from 1942, to date of trial (June 21, 1951) his ag-
gregate income from employment was $1945.00 (R. 175). 
Thus inorder to provide support for the family, in July 
1942 plaintiff began to work at U. S. Depot Second 
Street, Ogden, and was regularly employed there for 
about 2¥2 years ( R. 33). After deducting transporta- , 
tion expense, her net monthly salary was about $135.00 
(R· 34), and during the period that she was employed 
there, her net aggregate salary income was $3780·00 
(R. 173). Plaintiff was then transferred to Wicks at 
Logan, where she was employed for a period of S 
months, or until August, 1945, at a net monthly salary 
of $180.00 (R. 34, 35), or an aggregate of $1440.001 (R. 
173). Since September, 1945, she has had continuous 
employment at J. C. Penny Company at Logan (R. 36, 
37). Her net monthly salary from Pennys has been 
about $120.00 and during the last two years she has 
during evenings crocheted booties which were sold at 
the store, from which she received an additional income 
of $20.00 to $25.00 a month, (R· 36, 37) or an aggregate 
salary income at Pennys of $9000.00 (R. 173). The 
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money thus earned by plaintiff fro In July, 1942 to June 
1951, aggregated about $14,220.00 (R. 173). Plaintiff 
testified that the foregoing income was expended for 
g-rocery bills. household expenses, the purchase of furn-
iture. and support of the family ( R. 37, 195.) 
On several occasions while these parties resided in 
North Logan, defendant without provocation struck 
plaintiff in the face with his fist and she was disabled 
for several days (R. 41-47, 68). On one occasion plain-
tiff was in bed three days (R. 68). And since 1942 
when they removed to Logan, defendant has without 
provocation, violently struck plaintiff in public and at 
home, from which she suffered intense pain and was 
disabled for various periods of time (R. 41-46·) The 
defendant exhibited a violent temper, and was officious 
with plaintiff. Frequently when they were discussing 
something, he would precipitate quarrels because of his 
contentious attitude (R. 46-47). 
It also appears from the record that the defendant 
when attending socials, such as dances or private par-
ties, and after partaking of intoxicating liquor he be-
came quarrelsome and contentious and particularly with 
the plaintiff and it was at such times he berated her or 
struck her (R. 68). It also appeared that occasionally 
when plaintiff and defendant attended dances or socials 
that defendant assumed a hateful attitude towards the 
plaintiff and after they returned home he precipitated 
quarrels with, and ph~T:;;ically abused the plaintiff (R. 
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69.) At times when defendant abused plaintiff, she 
warned him that if he didn't desist she would seek a di-
vorce (R. 74.) That on account of the defendant's 
officious, quarrelsome and contentious attitude which he 
frequently manifested toward the plaintiff, which be-
came more intense during recent years, she became more 
nervous and upset (R. 47, 78), and was obliged to seek 
medical treatment from Doctor Hale, a Logan naturo-
pathic physician, Doctor Viko, a Salt Lake specialist in 
nervous diseases, and also Doctor C. J. Daines, family 
physician (R. 47, 48, 177, 178). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I The findings, conclusions and decree award-
1-ng plaintiff a divorce from defendant, are supported 
by competent as well as by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
There is direct and positive testimony by plaintiff 
that on several occasions, over a period of some ten 
years, defendant ha~ without provocation, forcibly 
struck the plaintiff with his fist about her face and 
head with serious effects ( R. -+ 1, 42, 43). On several 
occasions she was confined to her bed in order to recover 
from the injuries and shock (Tr. 42). The defendant 
admitted slapping the plaintiff (R. 126). During the 
month of December, 1949, these parties with ~fr. and 
Mrs. Anderson and l\f r. and 1\f rs. Johnson attended a 
dance, and after the dance the)r returned home and plain-
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tiff prepared a lunch and while they were eating de-
fendant being intoxicated stood up, hit his fist on the 
table and said: ''Even Jesus Christ is a phoney.'' They 
were all surprised and mortified (R. 42, 43). After the 
guests left the home, the defendant grabbed plaintiff 
by the throat, threw her backwards in the bathroom 
over the sink and seriously injured her back. He then 
called her the "filthiest names·" (R. 43) Their son 
was awakened and he called a taxicab, and meanwhile, 
defendant was sharpening a butcher knife and threat-
ened to ''finish'' plaintiff and their son. About that 
time they left home, going first to police headquarters 
to report the trouble created by defendant; then they 
went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, and remain-
ed there for three days until plaintiff recovered and 
defendant's temper abated (R. 43). Defendant admitted 
that plaintiff and son spent three days at J ohnsons' 
home. (R. 157) 
On another occasion in May, 1950, at a public dance 
defendant was intoxicated and in describing the inci-
dent plaintiff testified: ''And at that time he got very 
abusive. He put his hand in my face and pushed me 
back in the chair and stood over me there and called 
me very abusive names and swore as usual and caused 
the whole party to break up that night." (R. 44), Plain-
tiff testified that thereafter she refused to go out in 
public with him; that she had all the abuse she could 
take in public (R. 44) There were other occasions when 
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he abused her, but the foregoing were the most im-
portant occasions, as she testified: ''Those were really 
the times they really did hurt and hurt very deeply.'' 
(R. 44) 
Plaintiff testified that in addition to the foregoing 
acts of cruelty, defendant has at least three times a year 
since 1942, indicated that he was going to slap plaintiff 
and she has avoided same (R. 46)· And, in order to 
avoid being struck by him, she has ceased to ''discuss 
things with him." (R. 46) "He's quick tempered and 
he's very quick on the hands." "I didn't discuss any-
thing with him because Keith knows it all." (R. 46) 
Plaintiff testified that she could no longer endure 
such physical and mental abuse. That her, "nerves are 
completely gone." (R. 85). And as to the serious effect 
of such treatment by defendant she testified: "It has 
made me so nervous that there has been day after day 
that I haven't been able to take care of my work at the 
store because of my nervous condition. I've had to 
ask the other girls to assist me, and I have had to stay 
off the floor a lot of times and calm down so I could 
go out on the floor and sell. I'd take spells and have 
to have shots quite often, and I have taken medicine and 
pills at constant intervals for my nerves. Also treat-
ments from Dr. Hale.'' (R· 47) ~~ 
Plaintiff's condition gra~ually became worse,-"It 
started right after we were married, because I was so 
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nervous and so afraid of I~eith." (R. 47) It affected 
her nerves and heart (R. --l-8). Two years ago plaintiff 
consulted Dr. Yiko in Salt Lake City, and with respect 
to his diagnosis she testified: ''He (Dr. Viko) said it 
was nothing, only the nervous strain that I was living 
under." (R. ±8) 
Dr. C. J. Daines, family physician, testified that 
plaintiff has been extremely nervous, and that from ap-
pearances her condition could result from marital trou-
bles (R. 177, 178). Plaintiff testified that her condi-
tion has improved since she moved away from the de-
fendant (R. 48). The plaintiff is also corroborated by 
the witness :J[rs. Coleman who works with the plaintiff 
at Pennys store, who testified that since the complaint 
was filed she had observed an improvement in the plain-
tiff's condition. (R. 92-94). It will thus appear that 
plaintiff has patiently endured defendant's cruel treat-
ment. It would be difficult to find a case where a party 
withstood such abusive treatment for so many years. 
Plaintiff's life and welfare was and is at stake. 
The defendant admitted to some of the incidents 
testified to h~· plaintiff. He also admitted coming home 
intoxicated (R. 153). The witness Nyman testified that 
defendant became intoxicated on a number of occasions 
(R. 172)· Although defendant did not concede to all of 
the acts of cruelty testified to by plaintiff and, conced-
ing that there was some conflict in the evidence, yet the 
court heard the evidence and observed the demeanor of 
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the parties and their witnesses, and on disputed ques-
tions of fact he decided in favor of plaintiff. 
Defendant contended that plaintiff was cruel to him 
because of defendant's exhibits 1 to6 inclusive (R. 186-
188). This was a ridiculous contention. Plaintiff ex-
plained exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as common place which de-
fendant enjoyed at the time (about 7 years before the 
trial). They were brought home while plaintiff was 
working at U. S. Depot at Ogden (R. 186-188). Plain-
tiff didn't know where exhibit 4 came from. Exhibit 5 
was given to the defendant as a gift from the ladies 
at the store (R. 187, 201). Exhibit 6 was brought home 
by the defendant when he attended the D. A. V· conven-
tion in San Francisco (R. 186). When defendant saw 
fit to bring such trash into court it demonstrated how 
desperate he was to produce some kind of a defense. 
He was certainly scraping the bottom of the harrell. It 
also characterizes the defendant and gives a fair idea 
of what sort of an individual plaintiff lived with for 
twenty years. 
In the case of Edith Gardner Y. Earl Gardner, 222 
P. 2nd. 1055, the evidence revealed that the parties lived 
together about six months, and that during that period 
of time the defendant provoked a number of serious 
quarrels which finally culminated in l\i[rs. Gardner's 
suit for divorce in which she was awarded judgment, 
and on appeal the decision was affirmed. Mr. Justice 
McDonough wrote the opinion with unanimous concur-
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renee, and in the course of the opnion he stated: 
"With respect to the contention that plain-
tiff's conduct was such that she was equally as 
blameworthy as defendant, and that the court 
should have denied her a decree, we are not dis-
posed to disturb the findings of the trial court. 
The judge observed the demeanor of the parties 
and of their witnesses, and on disputed questions 
of fact he decided in favor of plaintiff. No doubt 
each of the parties expected that the other would 
make greater adjustments to assure marital har-
mony· Such an attitude, however, did not justify 
the defendant in doing things which destroyed 
his wife's affections for him, nor in initiating 
quarrels to keep her under a nervous tension. 
There is evidence sufficient to warrant a finding 
of mental cruelty.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that upon the authority 
of that decision, the trial court was warranted in find-
ing and concluding that defendant was guilty of mental 
and physical cruelty in the instant case. 
Point II. The findings, conclusions and decree a-
warding the home and furniture to plaintiff, is support-
ed by competent as 1rell as by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The defendant testified that the dwelling and lot 
was worth $4800.00 (R. 121, 161). Plaintiff valued the 
home property at $2500.00. (R. 83). The witness John-
son, an expert witness, valued this property at $3000.00. 
And that it had a loan value of about $1200 (R. 31) · 
It is rather difficult to understand defendant's theory 
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with respect to the value of the home property. He 
does not allege any particular value in his answer. But 
he prays therein for ''all the real property, Canadian 
bonds and Plymouth car together with a reasonable 
share of said furniture." In other words he asked the 
court to give him all the property, except a portion of 
the furniture. This is a rather reckless demand in view 
of the fact that it was plaintiff's income that supported 
the family from about July, 1942 until May 26, 1951, 
when the action was begun. Then he follows the fore-
going demand with a reckless and unfounded valuation 
on the real property of $4800.00 (R. 121, 161). This is 
about $1800.00 above the valuation placed thereon by 
a real estate man of thirty years experience (R. 30). 
It may be that defendant thought he could frus-
trate plaintiff's claim for the home by inflating its 
value far above the value of the bonds ($1340) and the 
car ($500). But after the court heard the valuation 
placed thereon by a disinterested witness, and the dis-
cription of the house and its size and ancient vintage: 
and considering and comparing the plaintiff's income 
of $14,200.00, with defendant's income of about $2000·00, 
during the same period of time, the court concluded 
that a fair division of the property would result b~· 
awarding the home and furniture to plaintiff, and the 
bonds and car, and some articles of personal property to 
defendant. But since the defendant had testified that 
the real estate was well worth $4800.00 (R. 121, 161), the 
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court afforded him an opportunity to acquire it by pay-
ing that price, and addinp; thE-reto $100.00 for the linol-
eum. and $100.00 for the curtains (R. 207). When de-
fendant's counsel said the home could not be sold for 
$4800.00, (R. 208) the court replied,-"You say the 
property is worth $4800.00, '' xxxxx ''and the court is 
giving him the right of getting the property at his own 
valuation." ( R. 208). 
Plaintiff had industriously made improvements on 
the home, and purchased new furniture from her income, 
and it is situated near the store where she is employed, 
and she will take care of it- On the other hand, if the 
court had awarded the home to the defendant, in addi-
tion to the bonds and the car, it would have been a 
grossly inequitable division of the property. And it 
is likely that he would neglect it. Plaintiff testified 
that during the time that he had possession of the 
home, between the commencement of the action and the 
trial thereof, she had occasion to go back to the home 
and she found it in a very disheveled and run-down 
condition. She testified that it looked terrible. (R. 191) 
The defendant contended that the car was worth 
only $200.00. However, the evidence showed without 
dispute that the car had a new motor and new tires, 
and the defendant informed the plaintiff that he would-
n't take less t~an $500.00 for the car. (R. 49) 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this 
case supports the courts findings, conclusions and de-
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cree, awarding to plaintiff the home, and furniture; and 
to the defendant the Canadian bonds, the car, and some 
articles of personal property. 
Point III. Condonation 
There was no allegation made in plaintiff's ans-
wer that the cruelty of the defendant, if any, was con-
doned by the plaintiff, and no reference was made to 
the subject of condonation during the trial. The find-
ings, conclusions and decree were signed by the Court 
on July 16, 1951, and there was no reference made 
therein to the subject of condonation. On July 23, 
1951, and after the case was closed, the defendant made 
a motion to amend his answer to provide that although 
defendant denies acts of cruelty, but,-'' if true, plaintiff 
has condoned the same.'' After some consideration of 
defendant's proposed amendment the court made a sup-
plemental finding to the effect that the parties had 
been quarreling and having differences with each other 
for a number of years, and after each severe quarrel 
there was a reconciliation and a conditional condonation 
on the part of the plaintiff But in each and every 
instance the defendant had failed to meet the conditions 
under which condonation was entered into between plain-
tiff, and the court therefore finds on this issue that 
there never was a complete eondonation between the 
parties. (R. 215) With the court's permission, plain-
tiff's reply was amended by adding the following para· 
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graph 21 ~- •Denies paragraph three of said answer as 
.. , .. 
amended. ( R. 7) 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the court's supple-
mental finding is correct. Respondent respectfully sub-
mits that the following rule is controlling here: 
'' .. \ repetition of the offense after condon-
ation reYiYe~ the original offense. Thus if a 
reconciliation tab.'s place after a separation be-
cause of cruelty, subsequent cruel conduct of the 
guilty party revives the former acts and permits 
a divorce upon the ground of all acts of cruelty, 
either before or after the reconciliation. An 
offense which has been condoned may be revived 
not only by a repitition of the same offense, but 
also by the subsequent commission of other mar-
ital offenses." 19 C. J. 88, Sections 204, 205. 
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully 
submits that the judgment and decree of the trial court 
should be affirmed, with costs. 
Respectfully submitted 
L. E. NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent-
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